



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS.*

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. Vol. I. By Herbert Spencer. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892. Pp. xii, 572.

This volume includes the first three parts of Mr. Spencer's ethical system, viz. : Part I., The Data of Ethics; Part II., The Inductions of Ethics; Part III., The Ethics of Individual Life. It is to be followed by a second volume containing the other three parts, viz. : Part IV., Justice (already published); Part V., The Ethics of Social Life, Negative Beneficence; Part VI., The Ethics of Social Life, Positive Beneficence. The last two of these parts may be expected to add considerably to the materials which we possess for judging of Mr. Spencer's system as a whole, and until these are published it would be premature to attempt to form any final estimate of the value of his contributions to ethics. The present volume does not add much to what we already know; and it may be sufficient for the present to give a brief summary of its general contents.

Part I. is already known to everybody, and it is here republished without alteration. Part II. is mainly occupied with the working out of contrasts between the ethical ideas of peoples at different stages of development, and especially of the one great contrast between the ideas of peoples at a military stage and those at an industrial stage of civilization. The latter are for the most part assumed to be well known to the reader, the former are illustrated as only Mr. Spencer can illustrate, by long series of quotations from various authors with regard to the opinions and sentiments of savage tribes and nations. The general conclusion which Mr. Spencer draws is (p. 467) that, "where the predominant social co-operations take the form of constant fighting with adjacent peoples, there grows up a pride in aggression and robbery, revenge becomes an imperative duty, skilful lying is creditable, and (save in small tribes which do not develop) obedience to despotic rulers is the greatest virtue; at the same time there is contempt for industry, and only such small regard for justice within the society as is required to maintain its existence. On the other hand, where the predominant social co-operations have internal sustentation for their end, while co-operations against external enemies have either greatly diminished or disappeared, unprovoked aggression brings but partial applause or none at all; robbery, even of enemies, ceases to be creditable; revenge is no longer thought a necessity; lying is universally reprobated; justice in the transactions of citizens with one another is insisted upon; political obedience is so far qualified that submission to a despot is held contemptible; and industry, instead of being considered disgraceful, is considered as, in some form or other, imperative on every one." If any one should think that these truths are not a very profound result to come out of over one hundred and fifty well-filled pages, it may be added at least that the illustrations which are given of them are often

* After this number the *Book Reviews* will appear in larger type.

highly interesting. Mr. Spencer also makes some good hits. Thus, he remarks (p. 317) that "Dr. Moorhouse, advocating a physical and moral discipline fitting the English for war, expresses the wish 'to make them so that they would, in fact, like the fox when fastened by the dogs, die biting,' and says that 'these were moral qualities to be encouraged and increased among our people, and he believed that nothing could suffice for this but the grace of God operating in their hearts.'" Or take this, evidently intended for Carlyle (p. 400): "Complete truthfulness is one of the rarest of virtues. . . . Exaggeration is almost universal. . . . And this habit sometimes goes along with the loudest denunciations of falsehood. After much vehement talk about 'the veracities' will come utterly unvarnished accounts of things and people,—accounts made unvarnished by the use of emphatic words where ordinary words alone are warranted; pictures of which the outlines are correct, but the lights and shades and colors are doubly and trebly as strong as they should be." This is excellent, but its moral effect is a little weakened when we find Mr. Spencer a few pages later (p. 403, note) describing the Greeks as "people guilty of so many 'atrocities,' characterized by such 'revolting cruelty of manners,' as Grote says, who were liars through all grades, from their gods down to their slaves, and whose religion was made up of gross and brutal superstitions." Could Carlyle have much heightened the color of this?

Mr. Spencer thinks (p. 470) that the facts adduced in this part of his work ought to "dissipate once for all the belief in a moral sense as commonly entertained." But he is pessimistic enough to add that he does not expect that they will. One would have thought that even Locke's arguments had been sufficient for this purpose. After all, where are the believers in the moral sense? They must surely be a feeble folk and dwell among the rocks, like the coneys. At least they do not seem to stray much into literature in these days.

Part III. of Mr. Spencer's book seems to me much more important. He here seeks to apply his principles to individual conduct; and though most of what he says is already contained in some form in other parts of his published writings, yet the summary now given is certainly of great interest. Mr. Spencer discusses the various duties of the individual under the headings Activity, Rest, Nutrition, Stimulation, Culture, Amusements, Marriage, Parenthood. Some of these—notably the last two—have, as Mr. Spencer remarks, a distinct social bearing; but it would evidently have been impossible to draw any absolute separation between purely individual and social obligations. Mr. Spencer's remarks under these various headings seem to me to be particularly valuable when he touches upon physiological considerations. This is a department of ethical study which he has made peculiarly his own; and anything which he says on this aspect of conduct ought to be regarded as carrying considerable weight. Thus, his views on work, sleep, food, drink, and recreation, though not perhaps containing anything very novel or original, and though their interest is in general rather physiological than ethical, are certainly worthy of attention. I think Mr. Spencer exaggerates when he says that ordinary morality takes no account of these things, except to the extent of recommending asceticism. It is true, however, that (setting aside the question of drink) ordinary morality attaches comparatively little importance to these matters. In this it seems to me that ordinary

morality is to some extent wise; for it is certainly not desirable that men should adopt valetudinarian habits, weighing their food like an apothecary and measuring out their enjoyments by the hour-glass. Neither, however, does Mr. Spencer recommend this; and indeed all that he says on these matters appears to me highly judicious. There can be no doubt that he deserves praise for the careful attention that he has given to this subject.

On the subject of culture, also, his remarks are equally interesting, though perhaps less convincing. "Taken in its widest sense," he says, "culture means preparation for complete living." It includes (1) necessary knowledge, (2) "all such development of the faculties at large as fits them for utilizing those various sources of pleasure which nature and humanity supply to responsive minds." The first kind is absolutely enjoined as a moral obligation. With regard to the second, "only those who accept hedonism can consistently advocate this exercise of intellect and feeling which prepares the way for various gratifications filling leisure hours." Why? Surely a man may recognize the importance of developing and exercising all his faculties, even if he does not regard pleasure as his supreme end. Nay, may he not consistently regard pleasure as having a certain value for its own sake, even if he does not believe that it *alone* has value?*

In the chapter on culture, Mr. Spencer insists once more on his favorite doctrine that "the first requisite is to be a good animal," and in this connection addresses some words of warning to students at Girton and Newnham. He thinks, however (p. 521), "that an adequately high culture, alike of men and women, might be compassed without mischief were our *curriculum* more rational."

In the chapter on marriage there are some criticisms (apparently weighty from the physiological point of view) on the Malthusian (*not* neo-Malthusian) remedy for over-population; while the chapter on parenthood contains a vehement plea for individual responsibility as opposed to our modern socialistic methods. Into the discussion of either of these questions it would be impossible to enter in such a review as this. I may content myself with remarking that the effort to provide a fair general education for every one, and to insist on its being made accessible to every one, does not appear to be fairly characterized as an attempt "to repeal by Act of Parliament a law of nature!" This, however, is Mr. Spencer's emphatic conviction. "A system," he says, "under which parental duties are performed wholesale by those who are not the parents, under the plea that many parents cannot or will not perform their duties,—a system which thus fosters the inferior children of inferior parents at the necessary cost of superior parents and consequent injury of superior children,—a system which thus helps incapables to multiply and hinders the multiplication of capables, or diminishes their capability, must bring decay and eventual extinction. A society which persists in such a system must, other things equal, go to the wall in competition with a society which does not commit the folly of nurturing its worst at the expense of its best." Perhaps. Carlyle also—certainly

* Mr. Bosanquet has well said of Hedonism ("History of *Æsthetic*," p. 391) that "it takes upon itself the hazard of exclusiveness. Other theories do not profess to exclude it, but it professes to exclude them."

no friend of Mr. Spencer—ridiculed our modern educational machinery as one of the marks of a mechanical age, and thought that we were losing our individuality.* Thus we have at least two prophets of evil, sufficiently vociferous, against our modern socialism. But is it so certain that the sense of individual responsibility varies inversely with the sense of national responsibility? And is it so certain that to give every one a fair chance is to foster the worst at the expense of the best? It does not seem to me that Mr. Spencer has proved this.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ETHICA, OR THE ETHICS OF REASON. By Scotus Novanticus, author of "Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta." Second Edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1891.

Although this book (now acknowledged to be by Professor Laurie) is nominally a scientific treatise on Ethics, it is largely—in fact, predominantly—concerned with Psychology. And the author would no doubt admit this with readiness, and would justify his treatment by the consideration that the ethical end has to be found by an elaborate examination of man's nature. "The end of every existence is itself" (p. 284), therefore to find out the *end* of man it is necessary to ascertain what man *is*—what *ought to be* being thus determined by reference to what is.

As regards Professor Laurie's psychological view, it seems to me that he has not quite made up his mind whether to prefer the old twofold division of mental phenomena into passive and active, or the later threefold division into cognition, will, and feeling. On the one hand, he appears to recognize reason, volition, and feelings; but on the other, he blends will and reason, contrasting them, as active and formal, with the passivity of feelings. This reduction of will and reason to a kind of confused joint-faculty, of which each seems in turn to produce the other, is at first sight a startling novelty in psychological analysis; it is at the same time the most distinctive feature of the author's psychological scheme. But it comes, I think, to little more than a peculiar way of expressing the analysis of psychical factors into active and passive—as seems tolerably evident when we consider his use of the term *Feeling*, which is applied not only to pain and pleasure, but also to what are frequently called *Sensations*—i.e., psychoses differing from one another in intellectual characteristics, but supposed to resemble each other in that they are passive or recipient. If the "identification" of will with reason does not mean more or other than that in cognition or intellection there is *activity* on the part of the Subject, then I should admit the "identification;" but I think that the truth intended is much better conveyed in the doctrine expounded by Dr. Ward (art. Psychology, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Ninth Edition), where we find attention and volition classed together as the activity of the Subject which *attends* to objects (things, ideas, or movements) presented to it, and *feels* pleasure or pain. This way of looking at the matter

* See especially his Essay on "Signs of the Times." Oddly enough, Carlyle is here at one with the Political Economists also—his great bugbear. See, for instance, Chalmers's "Christian and Civic Economy of Large Towns." It is interesting to compare this with Father Hunting-ton's article on "Philanthropy and Morality," in the October number of this JOURNAL.